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Abstract: The main idea of the article is to consider the interdependence 
between Politics of Memory (as a type of narrating the Past) and 
Stereotyping. The author suggests that, in a time of information revolution, 
we are still constructing images of others on the basis of simplification, 
overestimation of association between features, and illusory correlations, 
instead of basing them on knowledge and personal contact. The Politics of 
Memory, national remembrance, and the historical consciousness play a 
significant role in these processes, because – as the author argues – they 
transform historically based 'symbolic analogies' into 'illusory correlations' 
between national identity and the behavior of its members. To support his 
theoretical investigation, the author presents results of his draft experiment 
and two case studies: (a) a social construction of images of neighbors based 
on Polish narrations about the Past; and (b) various processes of stereotyping 
based on the Remembrance of the Holocaust. All these considerations lead 
him to state that the Politics of Memory should be recognized as an 
influential source of commonly shared stereotypes on other cultures and 
nations. 
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Introduction 
In the era of globalization and mass-communication, a proper selection of information 
becomes one of the most critical aspects of the cultural participation of the human 
being. The ongoing information revolution gave birth to a situation wherein, in 
principle, everyone has an unlimited access to infinite sources of knowledge. However, 
this process also resulted in a general excess of information and a reduction of its 
credibility. Since human beings aim at the reduction of the exhausting and resource-
consuming process of deliberation2, we search for reliable sources of information and 
simplified models of understanding Reality which may be applied immediately. 
Nowadays, almost everyone is able to travel, visit different states, and meet distinct 
cultures. Furthermore, almost everyone has the possibility to establish contact with 
members of other cultural communities. The metaphor of a 'global village' becomes 
more and more adequate, and neither political nor cultural borders limit the 
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communication between cultures. At the same time, the widespread access to mass-
media, especially television and the Internet, enables a flow of information on an 
unprecedented scale. But does it really change the way we construct images of others, or 
does it just cause a cognitive confusion? 
In November 2012, I conducted a draft experiment, investigating sources of images of 
other nations. I asked my students to list typical features of ten nations3 and substantiate 
their authenticity. The result of this exercise was surprising: most of the listed features 
were based on unverified stereotypes (about 60%) and historical narrations (about 25%), 
while a minority of them was based on personal intercultural contacts (about 10%) or 
verified knowledge (about 5%). In spite of the unlimited access to information and 
knowledge, as well as the visiting of different states, Polish students still constructed 
their representations of others mostly referring to simplified cultural contents and 
socially-shared understandings from the Past; for them, Americans were associated with 
an image of widespread obesity, Czechs with an image of drinking beer triflers, 
Frenchmen with an image of cowardice and betrayal in the presence of danger, Jews 
with an image of resourcefulness and greed, Germans with an image of scrupulous war 
criminals, Russians with an image of drunk imperialists, and Spaniards with an image of 
good-looking idlers. In February 2013, when I repeated the exercise with a group of 
Kazakh students, I received close results about sources of typical features in 
representations of other nations. 
This draft experiment preliminarily confirmed my presumption that, in the case of 
excess of information and necessity of its verification, individuals prefer to apply 
simplified models of understanding Reality, like socially-shared stereotypes and 
common opinions from the Past. These explanations are sufficiently reliable for us, so 
we do not expect infallible and authentic reasons (even if we are able to find them). We 
are satisfied with illusory correlations and overestimate the association between 
variables: being a member of a cultural group (e.g. nation) and a certain behavior (an 
attitude) or an action from the Past. As Catherine A. Sanderson pointed, it helps us “feel 
safe in an often unpredictable world”4 and believe that Reality is organized according to 
constant rules.  
The influence of this phenomenon, as Paul M. Sinderman, Richard A. Brody and Philip 
E. Tetlock pointed in their study, is deeper than just the using of simplified models in 
communication between individuals – they stated that even if someone's judgments 
about individuals are not driven by stereotypes, their general political choices still may 
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be.5 So, referring to my draft experiment and the students' answers – someone who 
states that Germans are 'scrupulous war criminals' may be open-minded while 
communicating with an individual German, but his/her general political choices may 
still be based on dislike and a feeling of threat, especially when this representation is 
supported by both cultural stereotypes and national remembrance. 
In this article, I would like to consider the relationship between historical 
consciousness, state narratives of the Past, and stereotyping others in a wider context of 
intercultural communication. I presume that in the age of information revolution and in 
the presence of excessive sources of knowledge, Politics of Memory becomes both a 
more reliable and more influential source of socially-shared representations of others. 
The paper includes a brief theoretical investigation based on my research studies related 
to the usage and the efficiency of Politics of Memory and its instruments, and two case 
studies, which seem to be quite representative: (1) depicting Russians and Germans in 
the Polish Politics of Memory and its influence on the construction of national 
stereotypes; and (2) constructing stereotypes as a result of the Remembrance of the 
Holocaust. 
 
Politics of Memory and Stereotyping 
Normally, we define ourselves and our identities on the base of two main factors: 
membership of groups and one’s own experience. Memory enables us to understand 
who we are and recognize our own place in social systems with reference to past 
actions.6 Moreover, memory makes it possible to perceive regularities and rules which 
organize Reality. Almost a century ago, Dorothy Wrinch stated: “linking up our 
investigations with the question of how knowledge of the past is possible, we see that 
memory is one of the bases of knowledge.”7 So, there is no individual knowledge about 
the Past without individual memory, and there is no collective understanding of History 
without socially-shared narrations about it. 
We may agree that Memory (and remembrance) plays two significant roles in the 
cultural life of a human being. It enables constructing identities on the basis of 
individual and collective experiences8, and it makes it possible to maintain a symbolic 
continuity of the Past, the Present, and the Future (expectations).9 Memory seems to be 
a powerful and important social resource. So, it is not surprising that it has become a 
subject of political interest, which uses narrations about the Past to popularize preferred 
attitudes and values, as well as to legitimate a government’s authority.10 
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The Politics of Memory is but one way of narrating the Past. However, I assume that it 
is the most influential amongst them; it is more widespread than Individual or 
Organizational Narrations and Local Memories, and unlike Historiography11, it is 
homogenous and coherent. The Politics of Memory determines socially-shared 
frameworks of remembrance and shapes popular understandings of the Past. At the 
same time, its narrations make use of the credibility of the state as a narrator, and the 
universality of its institutions (e.g. public education). 
As we have agreed with Wrinch's observation that memory is one of the bases of 
knowledge, we may also agree that shaping national memory causes changes in 
socially-shared (national) knowledge; because, if we believe that an action in the Past 
should be recognized as a heroic one, we will construct our definition of heroism with 
reference to this action, e.g. if we recognize Irena Sendler (who saved Jewish children 
from the Holocaust during the Second World War) as a Hero, we should understand 
heroism as an unselfish protection of the innocent from violence.12 Similarly, if we 
recognize a suicide bomber as a Hero, we should define heroism as killing enemies 
(infidels) and self-sacrifice as a struggle against evil. 
However, the efficiency of the narration depends on a few cultural conditions. We may 
assume that in Europe, the first example is more likely to occur than the second one. 
Even if the government commemorates suicide bombers and recognizes them as 
national heroes, most of the society (in a short-term perspective) will not share the 
definition of heroism as killing enemies and sacrificing oneself in this way. Lewis A. 
Coser properly pointed that “the present generation may rewrite history, but it does not 
write it on a blank page.”13 And this is the main limitation of the power of the Politics of 
Memory: a government may rewrite historical narrations and change their 
interpretation, but almost never will it narrate the Past from the very beginning.14 
The Politics of Memory describes the Past, it determines what should be remembered 
and what should be forgotten, and it defines who should be recognized as a hero and 
who should be recognized as a traitor. Unlike Historiography, the Politics of Memory 
does not limit itself to narrating History, but it also judges past actions and forces 
defined, emotional opinions or interpretations. It does not present deepened analyses, 
instead, it offers simplified labels and understandings based on essential divisions: 
good-evil, truth-falsity, heroism-cowardice, etc. And this is the evident common ground 
of the Politics of Memory and stereotyping. 
Both historical consciousness and the complex of stereotypes are results of socialization 
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and social learning. Furthermore, their acquisition is based on the need for simplified 
explanations about Reality and an aspiration for saving the energy needed to reflect 
upon such issue. We prefer simple and unambiguous interpretations of past actions, as 
well as easy-applicable scenarios of behavior to multilevel analyses and scenarios with 
multiple variables. Therefore, we are satisfied with simplified models like those used by 
my students in the draft experiment, e.g. Nazis were 'scrupulous war criminals' → 
Germans were Nazis → Germans are 'scrupulous war criminals' → Germans are 
scrupulous and dangerous.15  
This symbolic analogy links three phenomena: the remembrance, the stereotype, and the 
attitude towards others, and it presents them as correlated. The Politics of Memory 
enables understanding and interpreting past actions in an unambiguous and emotional 
way; narration and its elements enable expressing specific opinions about every actor of 
a past action, which is favorable to constructing stereotypes. Finally, as we have agreed, 
stereotypes influence individual attitudes. Not only attitudes towards each member of 
another group, but as Sinderman, Brody, and Tetlock pointed, also attitudes towards 
whole nations and political choices connected with cooperating with them. Furthermore, 
Galen V. Bodenhausen, Andrew R. Todd, and Jennifer A. Richeson claim that 
stereotypes may also influence another aspect of communication: “spontaneous 
behaviors such as nonverbal reactions”16 which are based on automatic associations. 
We may agree that this 'junction' seems to be quite dangerous. If an ordinary stereotype 
is based on an overestimation of the association between variables (one's identity and 
behavior), the stereotype based on historical narrations derives its social influence from 
an affirmation of the extraordinary significance of the past action and an inter-
generational experience. The peculiar source of stereotypes and the permanent 
reproduction of narrations make the association stronger and more durable. 
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Image 1 represents this process. The past action is interpreted by the government and 
narrated as Politics of Memory. Then, the narration depicts actors (individuals and 
groups), their behavior, attitudes, beliefs, values, and attributes and labels them using 
emotionally characterized representations. Constructed images based on the Politics of 
Memory are simplified and unambiguous, because the accessibility of the narration 
forces describing characters, their identities, and their actions with reference to essential 
divisions. These images may be transformed into commonly-shared stereotypes after 
their simplification and generalization.  
We may consider an example based on Jungmin Seo's study of the Remembrance of the 
Comfort Women in China and South Korea. He noticed that the narration about 
Japanese atrocities during the Second World War is “represented by individuals' 
excruciating narratives”17, which “makes a history of victimization as the core of 
identity formation.”18 Images are unambiguous and they definitively state who the 
victim was and who the slaughterer was. Then, emotional representations enable the 
construction of stereotypes, which are strengthened by “the unfortunate political path of 
Japan that failed to separate pre-war and post-war Japanese identities”19. 
This process connects the understanding of the Past and the stereotype thanks to three 
basic actions: (1) interpretation of History; (2) depiction of the narrative; and (3) 
simplification and generalization of narrative-based images. However, the Politics of 
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Memory is not the only way of narrating the Past which influences this process of 
transforming cultural contents. As we agreed with Coser's opinion about the limits of 
re-writing national remembrance by the state, and as we may notice in Image 1, the 
Politics of Memory is one of five possible media which can transform the past action 
into a source of stereotyping. Other media are: individual narrations (an eye-witness' 
testimony), organizational narrations (institutional memory), local memories, and 
historiography (scientific research) establish the cultural frameworks in which the 
government may interpret and depict the Past. Without a coherence of all types of 
narrative, the Politics of Memory may be recognized by society as unreliable or even 
counterfeit.  
It is necessary to consider how the government may influence the social construction of 
stereotypes through the narrative of the Past, and under which conditions it is possible. 
As we agreed, the very first condition is the coherence of the Politics of Memory and 
other socially-shared historical narrations. In Image 2, we may notice that this condition 
is fulfilled thanks to the use of 'academic research' and 'the polyphony of narration' as 
instruments of the Politics of Memory. The first one enables the application of academic 
research and establishes a connection between the state's narrative and Historiography, 
while the second one makes use of other types of narrations as a legitimization of the 
authority of the Politics of Memory.20 
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But the fulfillment of the first condition does not explain the establishment of the 
'junction' between remembrance, stereotyping, and social attitudes towards others. It 
explains only how it is possible to narrate the Past in a reliable way. As we have noticed 
before, the construction of stereotypes requires unambiguous and simple associations of 
two variables: someone's identity and features (behavior). The presence of this 
correlation should be recognized as the second condition. In Image 2, this condition is 
fulfilled by the use of 'defining attitudes and values' as an instrument of the Politics of 
Memory. 
Defining attitudes and values is a basic goal of the Politics of Memory. Considering the 
American Remembrance of Abraham Lincoln, Barry Schwartz and Howard Schuman 
stated that a direct relationship between the character and attitudes connected with his 
life enables a continuation of the reproduction of narratives, as well as their transition to 
the present.21 In his earlier works, Schwartz noticed that narrating the Past does not only 
aim at commemorating national heroes and historical landmarks, but also at explaining 
how people should behave now, and what beliefs, expectations or values they should 
share. This remembrance is significant because it, at the same time, explains the Past 
and directs the Present and the Future22. 
Remembrance and the Politics of Memory are more than narratives of the Past, they are 
a structure of interdependence between memorizing, recalling, identifying, and acting; 
they are also a justification of emotions and ways of reacting to social or political 
stimuli23. Historical narration may be used as a symbolic constitution of an appropriate 
behavior and a source of knowledge explaining which values are socially approved and 
commonly recognized as proper24. Moreover, we may assume that a Politics of Memory 
which only narrates the Past without emotional interpretation and labeling will be 
worthless for any government (as far as we agree that the aim of the Politics of Memory 
is to influence social attitudes and interactions). 
Defining attitudes and values as an instrument of the Politics of Memory establishes an 
axiological order of narration; it explains who the hero was, who the slaughterer was, 
and who the traitor was in a simple way. This instrument delivers an unambiguous 
image of Reality, there is no place for doubts or deliberations. Germans are responsible 
for the Holocaust, so Germans are slaughterers, or Japanese are responsible for the 
sufferings of Comfort Women, so Japanese are slaughterers – these symbolic analogies 
precisely demonstrate the process of transformation of historical narration into the 
stereotype. 
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However, the fulfillment of the second condition does not force a social acceptance of 
the stereotype. Even if the narration is legitimized and recognized as a reliable one, and 
even if it includes some simplified associations between someone's identity and his/her 
features (which may be transformed into a stereotype), there is no certainty that the 
stereotype based on this narration will be constructed and commonly shared. There is 
also the third condition which has to be fulfilled: the narration needs to be widespread. 
The government has at least three main instruments which it may use to popularize the 
narrative. These are: (1) education; (2) specialized institutions such as museums, 
institutions, centers, chambers or galleries; and (3) the usage of mass-media, especially 
television and the Internet25. Only thanks to them is the transmission of stereotypical 
contents possible. In schools, museums, and educational centers we learn not only about 
History, but we also assimilate its interpretation and accept certain attitudes and values 
which are defined in the narration26. And it is similar when we watch a TV series or a 
movie, and visit a website – we meet an interpretation of the Past which forces us to 
understand Reality in a certain way.27 
Summing up, just as the stereotype is based on illusory correlations between two 
variables, the Politics of Memory makes use of symbolic analogies which enable the 
establishment of a relationship between past actions and present choices. The illusory 
correlation and the symbolic analogy are quite similar processes of simplification, 
which may transform a narration about the Past into a socially-shared stereotype. This 
phenomenon is possible under three conditions: (1) if a narration is recognized as 
reliable; (2) if a narration defines general attitudes and values in a simplified and 
emotional way; and (3) if a narration is widespread and there are some instruments for 
its popularization. The fulfillment of these conditions enables the social construction of 
durable stereotypes based on historical narrations, and the reconstruction of images of 
others, thanks to the narrative of the Past.  
 
Polish Remembrance in an Intercultural Perspective 
In my draft experiment, Polish students were asked about the characteristic features of 
ten nations. In general, they based their answers on two types of sources: socially-
shared stereotypes about others and simplified associations based on national 
remembrance. In order to substantiate their authenticity, they used the phrase 'because 
everyone knows that...' (e.g. Russians drink a lot of liquor or Americans eat a lot of fast-
food, so they are obese), which referred to ordinary illusory correlations, or the phrase 
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'because everyone remembers that...' (e.g. Frenchmen betrayed their allies in 1939, or 
Russians conquered neighboring nations, or Germans committed war crimes during the 
Second World War), which referred to remembrance-based symbolic analogies. 
It is evident that most of the second-type associations have been caused by common 
understandings of History, and influenced by the Polish Politics of Memory28. The 
results of the test on attitudes towards History and national remembrance, taken by 
participating students before the experiment, confirm this presumption29. As I 
mentioned before, a quarter of all answers was directly based on historical narrations, 
but this number increased if the historical connection between Poles and nation was 
developed; so, less symbolic analogies were used to describe characteristic features of 
Japanese or Spaniards, while almost half of the features assigned to Germans, Jews, and 
Russians were related to historical narrations.30 
The common history of Poles and these three nations seems to be the core of the Polish 
Politics of Memory, where other nations appear only occasionally. The sore experience 
of conflicts with Germany and Russia, as well as the heritage of Polish-Jewish 
coexistence, shape the frameworks of Polish historical consciousness. However, all 
narrations are subordinated to the supra-narration of the Polish Politics of Memory – the 
Second World War and its aftermath. Tatiana Zhurzhenko stated that this subordination 
is part of a wider political phenomenon. She stated that the War “was the major pan-
European trauma, […] a tragic experience shared by virtually all European nations. But 
it is also true that nothing divides Europe more than the memory of this war, which 
ended almost seventy years ago”31. 
The Remembrance of the Second World War is not only a complex of narrations which 
prevent European nations from a full reconciliation, but it is also a source of widespread 
stereotypes. We may consider two examples from the Polish Politics of Memory: the 
depiction of Russians and Germans. As I noticed before, in my draft experiment, 
students at the very first place described Russians as 'drunk imperialists' and Germans 
as 'scrupulous war criminals'. It is important to ask if these associations were caused by 
the Politics of Memory or not. 
It is not just a Polish custom to characterize Russians as the nation overusing liquors 
and to associate 'being Russian' with 'being drunk'. We may recognize it as a universal 
stereotype, present in different cultures. However, the image of drunk Soviet soldiers is 
popularized in numerous testimonies quoted in historical narrations32. Eye-witness 
testimonies also depict Russians as uneducated and primitive people without “basic 
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technical knowledge”33. 
But what seems to be remembered the most is the image of ruthless repression and 
atrocities – e.g. Przemysław Wywiał quoted the testimony of one of the defenders of the 
city of Grodno, who had written: “after Soviets came, they arrested my colleague. […] 
They took him to a truck and killed him, he was cut by a burst. They left his corpse in 
the street”34. The permanent reconstruction of these narrations causes Polish opinions 
about Russians to include, at the same time, fear and dislike, and a feeling of cultural 
superiority. All these emotions directly refer to the remembrance of the Second World 
War, communist repression, and Soviet occupation of Polish territories. 
However, the more significant in this description of Russians is the second part of it – 
'imperialists'. Poles not only remember ruthless actions of individual Soviet soldiers, but 
they associate the Russian state with repeated aggressions and the desire to conquer 
Poland, what seems to be the core of Polish 'recurrence' of History35. The Partition of 
Poland in the 18th Century, the 1794 Kościuszko Uprising, the 1830-1831 November 
Uprising, the 1863-1864 January Uprising, the 1919-1921 Polish-Soviet War, and 
finally the Soviet Aggression in 1939 and the sovietization of Poland after the Second 
World War – all these national narrations depict Russia as a state whose identity is 
founded on imperialism, expansionism, and a will to conquer neighboring nations36. 
The symbolic analogy is clearly seen in a statement of President Lech Kaczyński, 
delivered on the 3rd March 2008 during the official lunch with Georgian President 
Mikheil Saakashvili. He stated that “Georgian and Polish Nations have similar histories 
– because both these nations have to continue their tough struggle for freedom. Both 
were victims of the Russian imperialism”37. Few months later, on the 29th September 
2009 in New York City, Kaczyński emphasized that the imperial tendency is the 
essential content of Russian identity, which is inscribed into the national tradition and 
the structure of government-society relations in Russia.38 
This image of Russia and Russians is widespread in the Polish society. The powerful 
eastern neighbor is commonly recognized as dangerous and unpredictable. 'Because 
everyone remembers that...' Russians destroyed independent Poland in the 18th Century, 
Soviets allied themselves with the Nazi Third Reich and attacked Poland in 1939, and 
Soviets murdered thousands of Polish prisoners of war during and after the Second 
World War. And, what is essential is that, if it happened in the Past, it may also happen 
in the Future, so the real nature of Russians should be remembered – that is how the 
symbolic analogies become stereotypes in Polish-Russian relations. 
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A creditable Polish historian and one of the creators of the contemporary Polish Politics 
of Memory, Paweł Machcewicz noticed that “Poland had two enemies and occupants. 
Their guilt and crimes against the Poles are not equal. The German aggression destroyed 
the existence of the Polish state. However, it happened with the Russian acceptance and 
their participation in the partition and occupation of Poland. The higher number of 
Polish citizens killed by Germans and their policy endangered the biological existence 
of the nation. […] When in 1944 the Soviet Red Army once again invaded Polish 
territories, it brought enslavement and a communist regime, but at the same time it 
brought liberation from the genocidal actions of German occupants. That is how most 
Poles experienced it. It was not a lie of communist propaganda, but a historical fact”39. 
The traumatic experience of German occupation and mass-murder policy during the 
Second World War still constitutes Polish historical consciousness. The Remembrance 
of the Holocaust and other mass repressions against the civilian population, intellectual 
elites and prisoners of war causes Germans to be depicted as Nazi slaughterers even in 
modern-day Polish society. However, unlike Russians, they are not depicted as 
unpredictable, chaotic, and impetuous, but as scrupulous and well-organized, so even 
more dangerous. As Machcewicz emphasized, German policy during the War 
endangered the biological existence of the whole nation, and as Tomasz Domański and 
Andrzej Jankowski stated, the genocidal policy was methodical and premeditated40. 
This image is strengthened by two different factors. First, it is a social heritage of 
communist propaganda which presented Nazi Germans as a symbolic representation of 
Evil and popularized this stereotype. Second, it is a more universal association between 
'being German' and 'being scrupulous', which is often used as an instrument of German 
soft power (e.g. by German industry41) and is present in numerous cultures. However, 
after the democratic transition and the Polish accession to the European Union, we have 
experienced a clear separation between the contemporary and the Nazi German 
identities in the Polish Politics of Memory. In general, Poles still associate 'being 
German' with 'being responsible for mass-atrocities during the Second World War', 
which is represented by describing them as 'scrupulous war criminals', like my students 
did in the draft experiment. This stereotype is present also in political actions42, as it 
was clearly seen in President Kaczyński's policy towards European integration. In 
August 2006, he reminded that German responsibility for the atrocities during the 
Second World War implied – even in the 21st Century – additional duties towards the 
whole Europe. Kaczyński said that the strong social support for the Nazi government 
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during the War should make the whole German nation responsible for the atrocities of 
the Second World War43. 'Responsibility' seems to be a key-word to understand 
Polish-German relations. Even the pro-conciliatory Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, 
during the celebrations of the 70th anniversary of the Outburst of War, said that “we, 
Poles, wish to hear words about responsibility, about truth, to make today’s meeting a 
sign of hope for this part of the world”44, and forwarded these words mostly to 
Germans. 
Summing up, narrations of the Polish Politics of Memory deliver numerous images of 
Russians and Germans and establish stereotypes about these two nations. Most of them 
are related to the Remembrance of Second World War, the most painful national 
experience in the 20th Century, which still influences Polish national consciousness. 
Even now, both individual opinions and political actions are constituted by symbolic 
analogies based on the simplified reason 'because everyone remembers that...' which 
seems to be a phrase that transfers contents from narrations about the Past to the 
complexity of stereotypes.  
 
Stereotyping the Holocaust 
The unique aspects of the Remembrance of Second World War are narrations about the 
Holocaust which also seem to be extremely significant in the Polish Politics of Memory. 
The long history of Polish-Jewish coexistence had its climax during the German 
occupation and the trauma of 'the Final Solution' still influences relations between these 
nations. However, the common sore experience of the genocide has resulted less in the 
establishment of a community of memory, than in constituting stereotypes in both 
cultures. 
Stereotyping the Holocaust is a more universal cultural phenomenon. Western culture 
has seen the worldwide Jewish Diaspora and the State of Israel spread the notion of the 
Holocaust as a unique and singular case in the history of the World, recognized as the 
model and 'standard' for the suffering of any nation. 'The Holocaust' has become a 
synonym of 'the genocide', and Jewish history has become a 'model martyrdom of the 
nation'45. Genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda, situations in Chinese Tibet and Somalia, 
and the war in Chechnya were more than once compared to the Nazi policy during the 
Second World War46. 
We may notice that it is common to associate 'being Jewish' with 'being a victim' or 
'being a survivor'. The significance of the Holocaust forces Western societies to 
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recognize Jews as primary victims of the Nazi genocidal policy, and in general as those 
who survived the genocide. This simplification is additionally strengthened by the 
feeling of guilt – in Germany and former Nazi allies caused by the perpetration of the 
Holocaust47, while in other Western states caused by not giving help and not preventing 
the genocide. As a result, as Robert Braun emphasized, some authors argue that “the 
Holocaust possesses an explicit moral meaning that should be represented in all 
historical narrative”48. 
However, the Jewish community and the Israeli society often opposed recognizing the 
Holocaust as the main content of Jewish identity and image. Yael Zerubavel noticed that 
the sore experience of Nazi extermination caused the popularization of the Masada 
narration in Palestine, as a counter-metaphor which exhorts Jews to commit to 
self-defense against all enemies49. The existence and protection of the independent state 
of Israel became a counteraction against permanently associating 'being Jewish' with 
'being a victim', especially 'a helpless victim'. All Israeli military actions in the 20th and 
21st Centuries caused a dichotomy in stereotyping Jews. While Western societies still 
construct their representations with reference to the experience of the Holocaust, and 
depict Jews as victims of fanatic hate and the murderous plan of 'the Final Solution', 
Arab societies recognize Jews as cruel occupants and slaughterers, whereas Arabs depict 
themselves as victims of Israeli expansionism and Zionist terror.50 
Even if Israeli foreign and internal policies explain why Arab and Western societies 
have opposite images of Jews, they cannot be recognized as the reason why Polish 
students depicted Jews more like Palestinians than Germans51. There are six main 
causes for this situation, and at least five of them are directly related to the Polish 
Politics of Memory and historical consciousness52. 
First of all, Poles recognize themselves as 'survivors' and 'victims' of the Second World 
War and commemorate victims of the Holocaust in the wider context of Nazi repression. 
In Polish historical narrations, the extermination of the Jewish population is not a 
universal symbol of war atrocities, but it is only a part of the national martyrdom. While 
in Western Europe or in the United States the Holocaust narratives are the main content 
of the Remembrance of Second World War, in Poland they are on par with other 
narrations, like the Katyń Massacre, the 1944 Warsaw Uprising or the Expulsion of 
Poles. 
Secondly, during the communist regime, the Remembrance of the Holocaust was 
incorporated into the complex of Polish martyrdom. Jewish victims of Nazi occupation 
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were not considered as 'being of Jewish nationality' but as 'Polish citizens'. So, the 
feature of 'being a victim' was not associated to the identity of 'being Jewish', but to the 
identity of 'being a Polish citizen'. Moreover, during Soviet occupation and communist 
rule, the negative stereotype of 'Żydokomuna' (Jude-Communism) was strengthened in 
Poland. Numerous Polish anti-communists blamed Jews for the introduction of 
communism and for supporting the sovietization of the state. The over-representation of 
Jews in communist security services caused that many Poles did not recognize Jews as 
'victims', but more as 'slaughterers'. Currently, even if the Politics of Memory does not 
reconstruct this stereotype, it is still in use in society, and memories of the communist 
past still intensify Polish-Jewish tensions53. 
Another cause for this, is the lack of historical guilt. Poles do not recognize themselves 
as responsible for the Holocaust, as the Politics of Memory and the national historical 
consciousness foster the glorious image of Poles who did not cooperate with German 
Nazis. Moreover, Polish historical narrations depict this nation as the sole in Europe 
which protected Jewish co-citizens and really opposed Nazi extermination policies. In 
the 21st Century, the issue of Polish Righteous among the Nations has become one of the 
most significant aspects of national remembrance54. So significant that, in 2007, in a 
common initiative, Polish President Kaczyński and Israeli President Shimon Peres 
supported the candidacy of Righteous Irena Sendler for the Peace Noble Prize as a 
symbolic commemoration of all Polish citizens who, during German occupation, 
rescued their Jewish neighbors.55 
However, Jews do not agree with the Polish 'myth of innocence'. The publication of Jan 
Tomasz Gross's  Neighbors in 2001, which covered the history of the massacre of 
Jewish population in the village of Jedwabne in July 194156, was the beginning of a 
national debate over Polish-Jewish relations during the War and cases of Polish 
anti-Semitism57. Antoni Dudek noticed that the Jedwabne case was an ordeal for the 
Polish Politics of Memory and the newly-established Institute of National 
Remembrance; the aim was to counteract the spreading of a stereotype of Poles as an 
anti-Semitic nation who was co-responsible for the Holocaust58. However, neither 
academic research nor official inquiries changed the Jewish representation of Poles. But 
both actions have strengthened Polish images of innocence, which caused the deepening 
of differences between the Polish and Jewish historical consciousness, and – as a result 
– of mutual aversions. 
Summing up, there are three main aspects of stereotyping the Holocaust, which are 
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quite opposite. The universal Western stereotype associates 'being Jewish' with 'being a 
victim' and 'being a survivor', which is supported by the widespread feeling of guilt, 
and, especially in Germany, by the post-Holocaust national trauma. Part of the Jewish 
community opposed against this simplification and compared the Holocaust to the 
counter-metaphor of active resistance, symbolized by the Defenders of Masada. It 
caused another process of stereotyping – the association between the Holocaust and 
'helplessness'. Finally, in Poland we are able to observe 'the clash' of stereotyping  based 
on the Remembrance of the Jewish genocide. Because Poles believe in their innocence 
during the Second World War (and the Politics of Memory supports this belief) they are 
not able to agree with Jewish accusations and assumptions that Poles are co-responsible 
for the extermination of Jews. This struggle over remembrance causes the Polish society 
to reject the recognition of Jews as the primary victims of War, and historical narrations 
remind that Jews were not only 'victims' of the Holocaust, but also 'Soviet slaughterers' 
of Polish patriots and national martyrs. 
Polish-Jewish relations are remarkably influenced by mutual stereotypes based on 
historical experiences and their interpretation. The trauma of the Holocaust is 
underestimated in the Polish Politics of Memory; however, Jewish narrations equally 
underestimate Polish martyrdom. Jews used to state that 'maybe' Poles suffered during 
German and Soviet occupation, and 'maybe' some Jews caused their suffering, but 
'everyone remembers that...' Poles murdered their Jewish neighbors during and after the 
War, while Poles used to state that 'maybe' Jews suffered the most during German 
occupation and 'maybe' they are the primary victims of the Nazi genocidal policies, but 
'everyone remembers that...' Jews murdered their Polish neighbors during the Soviet 
occupation and after the War as communist servants. And symbolic analogies based on 
historical narrations are, in both cases, permanently transferred to national complexes of 
stereotypes. 
 
Conclusion 
The Politics of Memory and, in general, narratives of the Past are sometimes sources of 
stereotypes. Simplified associations and illusory correlations may be not only 
constructed as a result of isolated, accidental, and unrepresentative contacts between 
nations, but also as a result of symbolic analogies which are the cultural effect of 
narrating the Past. In this article, I presented a draft theoretical research that considered 
possible interlinks between these two phenomena in the intercultural context. Moreover, 
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I showed how the Politics of Memory influences recognizing others and understanding 
their features in Poland in the 21st Century. Examples of Polish-Russian and 
Polish-German relations seem to be significant and interesting, and they too present 
how the historically-based stereotyping may affect political actions. 
Depicting the Enemy – as in both these cases – is one of the most important aspects of 
the Politics of Memory, and it has an extensive influence on the state of relations 
between nations and their members. The transformation of Polish historical experiences 
into an aversion for neighbors is not an isolated example. We may consider American 
representations of Arabs after 9/11, East Asian opinions about the Japanese, images of 
Europeans in post-colonial cultures, and Palestinian representations of Jews and Israel 
as similar cases of the same phenomenon. However, we may notice the opposing aspect 
of historically-based stereotyping – depicting the Ally, which is clearly seen in 
European images of the United States and the American Nation. 
Moreover, in this paper, I outlined the complexity of stereotyping the Holocaust, mainly 
considering its impact over Polish-Jewish relations. To explain how it is possible that 
such a common stereotype in Western cultures, which associates 'being Jewish' with 
'being a victim' and  a survivor', is not widespread in Polish culture, I studied five causes 
which are directly related to national remembrance. This brief research confirmed my 
presumptions that representations of Jews in Poland and representations of Poles by the 
Jewish community are based upon mutual historical 'injuries' which still obstruct a real 
reconciliation between these nations. 
The hypotheses presented in this study are not final. Understanding the interdependence 
between narrating the Past and stereotyping requires further theoretical and empirical 
research. The goal of this article was to outline the phenomenon and to motivate 
researchers to carry out further studies. The Polish Politics of Memory seems to be only 
one (and probably not the most significant) area of transformation of historical 
narrations into stereotypes, but studying it enables us to notice how the social 
understanding of the Past may influence present relations between nations and the 
communication between their members. 
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